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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of trade liberalisation to 
differences in the level of prosperity across nations. We compare this with the relative 
contribution of institutional capacity to prosperity, as well as the role of human capital 
accumulation in that respect. We employ several concepts of institutional quality, trade policy 
and openness variables following various definitions prevalent in the literature. Unlike in the 
comparable study by Rodrik et al (2004) we have (a) included a role for human capital, (b) 
employed six institutional variables compared to one only in Rodrik et al (rule of law), (c) 
included trade policy variables, and not just openness indicators and (d) expanded the set of 
openness measures employed. We discover that opening up domestic markets to foreign 
competition by removing trade restrictions and barriers may be good for economic 
performance. Secondly, developing human capital is as important as superior institutional 
functioning for economic wellbeing. We find that openness counts for little per se in explaining 
income differences across countries. This is because it is an outcome and not a cause. Trade 
policies, and liberalisation, on the other hand, are not insignificant in explaining cross-country 
per-capita income variation. With regard to trade policies, export taxes are the most important 
in explaining cross-country per-capita income differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980s and early 1990s, many developing countries opened up their economies and 
became a more integral part of global finance and trade. There is a rich set of literature 
which already investigates income driven determinants and processes of economic 
development. The degree of international trade, which is viewed by many as engine of 
growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2002, 2003) is a good proxy for capturing the effect of 
globalisation on economic growth. Other fundamental determinants can be identified by 
rediscovering Adam Smith’s insight that countries need solid institutions for markets to 
work. Institutions capture many legal, political, economic and social outcomes that are 
necessary for development of the economy. Secure and stable property rights form the 
basis for well functioning legal institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004, for 
example). Representative political institutions with institutionalised representation of 
minority groups can represent institutions for conflict management. Fiscal and monetary 
institutions are necessary for ensuring economic stability. Many regulatory institutions 
which promote a successful market economy are also the representation of good 
economic institutions. Institutions of a well functioning social contract legitimise the 
market economy through social stability and social cohesion.  
 
This paper contributes to the debate over the relative role of institutions versus 
international trade integration (or policies) in determining relative levels of prosperity 
across countries. In this connection, some authors such as Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004, henceforth Rodrik et al.) claim that institutions dominate all other factors 
in determining income differences across countries. This analysis, based on an extension 
of their framework, is somewhat sceptical of this assertion. In addition, following Glaeser 
et al. (2004a, 2004b), we examine the role of human capital accumulation in this process, 
finding some support for their view that human capital can be just as important as 
institutional quality in determining future relative prosperity, and may even lead to 
improved institutional functioning. With regard to international trade and its impact on 
economic well-being, it should be borne in mind that trade can increase or decrease 
independent of any changes to the trade policy stance (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, export 
subsidies etc.).1 Globalisation factors that are external to an individual nation, may 
facilitate trade. Technological changes may make certain goods, imports for example, 
cheaper despite the presence of trade restrictions. Similarly, a fall in transportation costs 
or the end of war may alter the relative price of tradables encouraging greater 
international trade. Trade may increase income, but changes in trade policies may not 
foster increased international trade and hence not contribute to growth or poverty 
reduction. In short, one has to distinguish between openness, something that is an 
outcome of policy choices or serendipity; and trade policies aimed at promoting greater 
international trade, which might or might not succeed. The following empirical work, 
unlike most authors, including Rodrik et al. (2004), draws this important distinction. We 
employ wide ranging definitions of institutions and economic openness. A rigorous 
statistical investigation is thencarried out to do justice to the intellectual space which 
‘integration and institutions’ have received recently. The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology, and section 3 (regression analysis) 
contains our contribution to the debate. The analysis, although similar to Rodrik et al. 
(2004), goes beyond their work by including more institutional measures, openness 
indicators, as well as explicit trade policy variables and a role for human capital. Therein 
lays the innovation of this paper. Finally, section 4 concludes.  
                                               
1 Trade policy means, governmentally induced mechanisms that restrict, relax or facilitate the 
international exchange of certain or all goods and services.  
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2. Data and Methodology  
 
‘Once institutions are controlled for trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters 
the income equation with the ‘wrong (i.e.,) negative sign.’ (Rodrik et al, 2004, 131) 
However, in another paper published in the same year, Rodrik (2004) writes ‘I think the 
relationship is that the trade liberalization agenda today actually has become the 
elimination of (these) institutional differences (between developed and developing 
countries). ‘(p.517)  The comparison of two contributions by the same author suggests 
that Rodrik et al (2004) finding regarding insignificance of trade in determining long term 
growth rates has been more of a case of an emphasis on statistical significance 
(insignificance) than on economic significance (insignificance)’. To infer that trade does 
not matter from Rodrik et al (2004) results would be invalid.   
 
The economic significance of international trade and good institutions cannot be 
overemphasized. To be fair to Rodrik et al (2004), their findings need to be viewed in its 
right context. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) point out towards post 1980 promotion of 
international trade as a dominant determinant of economic growth such that other 
variables of interest had been largely ignored (for example see: Leamer, 1988; Dollar, 
1992; Edwards, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995 and Frankel and Romer, 1999). In this 
context, the empirical exercise undertaken by Rodrik et al (2004) has rightly brought back 
the importance of institutions into economic policy making by finding the dominant role 
of ‘rule of law’ in explaining development or lack of it among developed and developing 
countries. The role of trade has only been underscored because of its statistical 
insignificance in the model. Such results can always be re-evaluated by using better 
empirical specifications. We extend their analysis and utilize some new datasets in a 
similar empirical frame work as Rodrik et al’s (2004) to investigate the role of trade in 
relation to institutions and human capital. 
 
Our empirical model includes many of the core determinants of growth at the right hand 
side, namely international economic integration (including measures of openness and 
trade policy), measures of institutional quality and human capital. On the left hand side, 
present dependent variable is not growth per se, but the log of income per-capita. As 
argued, differences in per-capita income across countries are a result of differential 
growth rates in the past. This model follows the practice in Easterly and Levine (2003) 
and Rodrik et al. (2004) where the relative contribution of policies and institutions in 
explaining per-capita income differentials is tested. This model’s sample includes both 
rich OECD countries and developing countries. As regards policy, this paper examines the 
effect of both openness, as in Rodrik et al. (2004), as well as trade policy variables. 
Openness indicators are an outcome variable, pointing to the extent to which a country 
trades as a proportion of national income. Trade policy indicators are, however, a more 
direct measure of the policy stance, which Rodrik et al. (2004) did not examine. This 
paper deems these policy variables of greater significance in a test of the relative efficacy 
of policy vis-à-vis institutions.  
 
The final equation to estimate takes the following form:  
 
iiiii GeoHkTpNy εγχβα +++++=log    (1) 
 
The variable iy is income per capita in country i, iN , iTp , iHk , iPk  and iGeo are 
respectively measures for institutions, international economic integration or trade policy, 
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human capital, physical capital and geography, iε  is the random error term. 
Average years of schooling represent human capital. In order to have in-depth insight 
into how institutions or increased integration affects income per-capita, this paper 
employs several concepts of institutional quality, trade policy and openness variables 
following various definitions prevalent in the literature.  
 
We shall employ two general estimation specifications for right-hand side variables. In 
specification 1, we have combined openness or trade policy indicators with institutions as 
well as human capital; and specification 2 corresponds to Rodrik et al. (2004) where trade 
policy or openness indicators are juxtaposed only against institutions. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for all endogenous dependent, endogenous independent and 
independent measures and their respective definitions. 
  
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables Code Source Obs Std . Dev 
Dependent      
Difference in Per-capita GDP, 2000 Lny World Development Indicators 163 (1.138) 
     
Endogenous Independent     
Openness Variables     
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current Dollar prices, 
1985 
Lcopen World Development Indicators 170 (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91) 
     
Trade Policy Variables     
Import duties as % imports, 1985 Tariffs World Development Indicators 99 (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 
1985 
Owti Sachs and Warner (1995) 98 (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Pritchett (1996) 54 (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges, 1985 Totimpov85 Pritchett (1996)  
(Available for developing countries 
only) 
76 (21.30) 
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate 
inputs, 1985 
Owqi Sachs and Warner (1995) 96 (0.24) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987 Ntarfov87 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing countries 
only) 
76 (36.305) 
Sachs and Warners composite openness index, 1980 Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446) 
Leamer’s measure of openness based on residuals 
capturing deviations of actual trade from trade as 
predicted by an empirical factor proportions model 
of trade, 1980 
Leamer82 Edwards (1998) 47 (0.527) 
     
Institutional Variables     
Voice and Accountability, 1999 Range: 2.5 to -2.5 Va Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
170 (0.952) 
Political stability, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ps Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
156 (0.954) 
Government effectiveness, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ge Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
157 (0.893) 
Regulatory quality, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rq Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
166 (0.892) 
Rule of Law, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rl Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
166 (0.937) 
Control for Corruption, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ctc Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
159 (0.910) 
     
Human Capital     
Average years of Schooling, 1999 Sch99 Baro and Lee (2001) 109 (2.914) 
     
Instruments     
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares 
computed from a bilateral trade equation with 
‘pure geography’ variables, 1985 
Lfrkrom Frankel and Romer (1999) 163 (16.75) 
Fraction of the population speaking English Engfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 182 (0.236) 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the 
major languages of Western Europe: French, 
German, Portugese or Spanish 
Eurfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 185 (0.380) 
Drop out rate, 1990 Drop90 Barro and Lee (1996) 125 (0.802) 
Number of school days Schday Barro and Lee (1996) 139 (23.43) 
Distance from the equator of capital city measured 
as abs (Latitude)/90 
Disteq Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) 
(2001) 
208 (16.65) 
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2.1. Measuring Economic Growth:  
For most developing countries, growth rates have been highly volatile and unstable. In 
empirical studies, using growth rates as a measurement of development would also 
incorporate the volatility of growth rates in the analysis. Thus, per capita differences in 
income may be more suitable for an empirical exercise which sets out to determine the 
factors which lead to economic development. Income differences which prevail today 
among countries suggest that incomes in developing countries have failed to converge to 
that of higher income countries because of failing growth rates. An argument in favour 
of per capita income difference over GDP per capita growth rates does find some 
support in economic literature that has considered the econometric problems in using 
growth rates because of the enormous volatility of growth rates (Pritchett, 2000; 247)  
2.2. Measuring Institutions 
Kaufman et al (2003) have constructed six aggregate indicators of institutional quality: 
rule of law (Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness 
(Ge), voice and accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc). The six governance 
indicators follow either of the 3 basic definitions of governance: (1) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced (2) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
Kaufman et al (2003) relied on 194 different measures of governance drawn from 17 
different sources of subjective governance data constructed by 15 different sources 
including international organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, think 
tanks and non-governmental organizations. The governance indicators have been 
oriented so that higher values correspond to better outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 
while covering these values for 175 countries.  
 
The rule of law only partly defines governance, and by incorporating the other five 
measures of governance developed by Kaufman et al (2003), one can carry out a 
comprehensive institutional analysis. For example, voice and accountability has been 
constructed from number of indicators which measure different aspects of political 
process, civil liberties and political rights. In other words, voice and accountability 
measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection 
of governments. Independence of media is also part of voice and accountability, whereas 
it may capture the monitoring role of the media through which they hold governments 
accountable for their actions. Political stability (Ps) is broadly defined to measure stability 
of government and absence of violence. It includes perceptions of the chances that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and/or 
violent means from foreign or domestic forces of discontent or through terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness (Ge) and Regulatory Quality (Rq) captures the second 
dimension of governance which is to do with the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies. In other words it captures the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on ‘’inputs’’ 
required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and 
deliver public goods. (Kaufman et al, 2003: 3). Regulatory quality captures the incidence 
of market unfriendly policies which may include price controls, inadequate bank 
supervision and also perceptions of protection against foreign trade or excessive 
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regulation against business development. One important point to note here is that 
these indicators are based on perceptions.  
2.3 Measuring Integration: (openness/ Trade Policy Variables)2 
The ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness 
indicator (Frankel and Romer 1999; Alcala and Ciccone 2004; Rose 2002; Dollar and 
Kraay 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004). Cross country differences in trading volumes may not 
entirely reflect trade policy and level of integration of a country. Nevertheless, one may 
categorize the nominal openness measure as an outcome-based measure of trade policy 
which captures the deviation of actual outcome from what the outcome would have been 
without trade barriers.  
 
In addition to nominal trade shares, there are two additional measures of integration 
introduced in trade literature which are outcome based: Pritchet (1996) estimates trade 
flows adjusted for country-characteristics. He has categorized it as an outcome based 
structure adjusted trade intensity measure which estimates trade penetration. The 
adjustment has been done by accounting for structural characteristics such as level of per 
capita GDP, size (both area and population), transport costs and obvious resource 
endowment characteristics. The adjusted trade penetration measures are obtained for 
total trade (exports plus imports) (Tarshov) and total imports (Impnov).  
 
Neither of these measures are direct indicators of a country’s trade policy, pointing only 
towards the level of its participation in international trade. There are many incidence 
based indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as close proxies of trade policy (Pritchett, 
1996; Edwards 1998; Greenaway et al. 2001; Rose 2002). Despite some scepticism 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2004), empirical research has failed to come up with better alternates. 
According to Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), simple averages of taxes on imports and 
exports and NTB coverage ratios have generally passed the rigours of empirical research 
and all such incidence based measures are considered to have done a decent job in rank-
ordering countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes.  
 
Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges 
(Totimpov85) are all incidence-based measures of trade barriers and are considered good 
proxies for trade restrictiveness. All of the above are employed in this study. Other 
measures that capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. Here, the overall 
non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov87) and non- tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owqi) are the two proxies for non-tariff barriers.  
 
There is also a trend in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade policy. 
Edwards (1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80). The 
Sachs-Warner criteria defines a country as open if (1) non-tariff barriers cover less than 
40 per cent of trade, (2) average tariff rates are less than 40 per cent, (3) the black market 
premium was less than 20 per cent during the 1980s, (4) the economy is not socialist, and 
(5) the government does not control major exports through marketing boards. The 
rationale for combining these indicators into a single dichotomous variable is that they 
represent different ways policymakers can close the economy to international trade. 
Another measure of trade barriers is based on residuals from trade equations and it is 
computed for the total trade for a country as the sum of deviations of the predicted from 
                                               
2
 For detailed discussion on outcome based and incidence based measures of trade policy, see Rose 
(2002) and Pritchett (1996). 
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the actual level of net exports across all available commodities. Pritchett (1996) calls 
it the endowment adjusted trade intensity ratio or simply Leamer’s openness index 
(leamer82).  
2.4 Measuring Human Capital 
Although growth theory specifically focuses on the important role of human capital in 
form of education, the data on such an education measure which can easily be compared 
across countries has not been forthcoming until recently when Barro and Lee (1993) 
constructed a large data set on school attainments disaggregated by age, sex and level of 
schooling. They have also calculated average years of schooling which is a single 
comparable measure of school attainment that takes into account the significant 
variations across countries in the standard number of schooling at each level of 
attainment.  
 
In this paper, we use average years of schooling for 1999 (Sch99). Earlier years of 
schooling from say 1960 or 1965 can be utilized to measure differences in initial human 
capital across countries in order to find out historic role of human capital in determining 
levels of incomes. Average years of schooling for 1960 or 1965 can be considered as 
initial level of human capital in a sense that levels of human capital in 1960s would be 
independent to policies in the economic reform period of 1980s and afterwards. In 
contrast to human capital formation in 1960s, later years of schooling especially post 
1980s levels are interlinked with the reform period and would be as endogenous a 
concept as integration or economic growth is itself. Due to space constraints, this paper 
limits itself to average years of schooling for year 1999 as an endogenous variable. 
Nevertheless, suffice to say here that an intensive empirical exercise is also carried out 
where initial level of human capital is utilized in eq. 1 when it was considered exogenous. 
The results confirm that countries that have started out with low level of human capital 
have also lagged behind in incomes from countries that have started out with higher 
levels of human capital. The results are not presented or discussed here.  
 
In summary, this study employs six institutional and 11 openness variables in an attempt 
to undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional quality and exposure to 
increased international trade affects the economic performance of a country. Unlike in 
the comparable study by Rodrik et al. (2004), this paper has (a) included a role for human 
capital, (b) employed six institutional variables compared to only one in Rodrik et al. (rule 
of law), (c) included trade policy variables and not just openness indicators, and (d) 
expanded the set of openness measures employed.  
2.5 Finding the Instruments 
There are potential endogeneity problems between per-capita income and institutions, 
per-capita income and human capital, as well as between openness (or the trade policy 
stance) and income per-capita. One way of cleansing the empirical analysis from 
endogeneity in explanatory variables and the reverse causality between dependent and 
independent variables is to adopt Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques in the context of 
two stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS). As a first step to run IV regressions, 
we need to find appropriate instruments for the 11 openness/trade policy variables, six 
institutional concepts and human capital. The first stage estimation includes instruments 
for the regressors with potential endogeneity problems. The regression estimate in the 
next stage utilizes the predicted values of these variables in a standard per-capita income 
or growth regression as in Eq. (1).  
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Trade between nations may in most cases also capture their geographic proximity to each 
other in addition to other things. Frankel and Romer (FR) (1999) obtain predicted trade 
shares through a gravity equation. These are utilized to instrument outcome based 
measure of openness. (Rodrik et al, 2004). Traditionally, especially in 1980s, countries in 
the South, South East and East have been on average more protective than the countries 
that lie in the North, North West or West. Since all proxies of incidence based measures 
of trade barriers are for the period of 1980s, FR trade shares based on gravity equation 
may effectively explain trade policy in addition to openness.  
  
A popular institutional instrument in the cross country growth literature has been the 
measure of settler mortality as suggested by Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) 
(2001). AJR argued that colonial settlements were directly proportional to the mortality 
rate of the settlers, whereas settlements affected early institutions which have persisted 
and formed current institutions. Recently, Rodrik et al (2004) has shown that AJR’s 
settler mortality works very well to explain institutions. However, there are some serious 
drawbacks to this instrument. First, the data is only available for 64 countries. Rodrik et 
al. (2004) extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low numbers when 
compared to another widely used institutional instrument namely, ‘fractions of the 
population speaking English’ (Engfrac) and ‘Western European languages as the first 
language’ (Eurfrac), which covers as many as 140 countries. In addition to data limitation, 
settler mortality may be correlated with error terms in growth equations because of its 
strong relationship with human capital. According to Glaeser et al (2004a), it is not clear 
what Europeans really brought with them when they settled. It might be that what 
settlers brought with them was themselves and therefore their know-how and human 
capital. Here we follow Hall and Jones (1999), to use ‘fractions of the population 
speaking English’ (Engfrac) and ‘Westem European languages as the first language’ 
(Eurfrac) as instruments for the institutional proxies (Va, Ps, Rl, Ctc, Rq and Ge), as 
arguably the most desirable institutions originate from that segment of Europe.  
 
There are many qualitative and quantitative measures of education which can be potential 
instruments for average years of schooling (Sch99). Public spending on education, real 
public educational spending per pupil, teacher salary, pupil teacher ratio, availability of 
teaching material at different levels of education. Most of them have been available in 
Barro and Lee data sets and utilized in various studies (Barro and Lee, 2001; and 1996). 
Can they be instruments for average years of schooling? In growth framework, most of 
these qualitative and quantitative proxies of education are interlinked with incomes and 
thus would be correlated with error terms in equation 1. In contrast to these measures, 
proxies for student performance are relatively exogenous educational inputs capturing 
the element of student capability. Cross country data on test scores and drop out rates 
are available. The data on test scores for single common subject area is not comparable 
for larger set of countries (e.g. only mathematics sciences cover a maximum of 50 
countries), whereas data on drop out rates are available for 125 countries.  
 
Barro and Lee (2001) define drop out rates as the percentage of children who start 
primary school but do not eventually reach the final grade of primary school. The 
variable is constructed by using data on enrolments and repeaters. Though the drop out 
rates are much higher in developing countries then in the OECD countries, the pattern 
may well be attributable to difference of culture than that of economic development and 
thus any relationship of drop out rates with income would only be indirect. The over 
identification and endogeneity tests which will follow in next sections will confirm 
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whether drop out rates are correlated with error terms or they exogenously determine 
average years of schooling to eventually determine differences in per capita incomes.  
Table 2 
Drop Out Rates 
Country Drop out rate 
1990 1970 
   
Finland 0% 0% 
Norway 0% 0% 
Sweden 0% 0% 
Singapore 0% 6.3% 
Egypt 0% 22.1% 
Denmark 1% 3% 
Israel 1% 1% 
SriLanka 3% 6% 
Uruguay 7% 14% 
Tonga 8% 8% 
United States 11% 11% 
China 15% 15% 
Belgium 19% 22% 
Zambia 16% 24% 
Uganda 24.3% 22.4% 
Argentina 34.3% 36.3% 
Bangladesh 53% 78% 
Brazil 80% 78% 
Afghanistan 72% 22% 
   
 
 
Table 2 presents drop out rates for select number of developed and developing countries 
for the periods of 1990 and 1970. It is interesting to note that trends in drop out rates are 
quite independent to differences in incomes. Egypt and Sri Lanka fare better than the 
United States. China, despite its robust economic growth trends showed no 
improvement in drop out rates between 1970 and 1990. Belgium scored as low as 
Zambia and Uganda. Brazil and Argentina are affluent Latin American countries with 
high drop out rates compared to Uruguay. For Brazil, the drop out rate is slightly higher 
than that of present day war trodden Afghanistan. Considering these cross country 
patterns, one can safely suggest that drop out rates (Drop90) would not be related with 
the error terms in equation 2.1 and are exogenously determined in our framework. 
Another instrument which may exogenously explain Sch99 is number of school days in a 
year (Schday) and has been utilized here.  
 
Finally as in Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik et al (2004), we employ ‘distance from the 
equator’ as a fifth instrument (proxy for geography). This is a purely exogenous concept. 
The IV regression model has three equations, where in the first stage predicted values of 
institutions, openness/ trade policy and human capital are generated respectively by 
regressing them on 5 instruments.  
iiiii FREurfracEngfracN 1111 τνφλ +++=  
NiiGeoSchdayDrop εθρϖ ++++ 111 90  (2) 
 iiii FREurfracEngfracTp 22221 τνφλ +++=  
NiiGeoSchdayDrop εθρϖ ++++ 222 90  (3) 
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iiii FREurfracEngfracHk 3333 τνφλ +++=  
NiiGeoSchdayDrop εθρϖ ++++ 333 90  (4) 
Where as iEngfrac  and iEurfrac are instruments for institutions referring to fractions 
of population speaking English and European languages respectively. iFR is instrument 
for trade policy. iDrop90  is annual drop rate for 1990 and iSchday  is number of school 
days in a year. iGeo is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the 
second stage, the predicted values of respective institutional, openness/ trade policy 
variables and human capital are in the per-capita income Eq. (1). 
3 REGRESSION RESULTS 
3.1 Tests for the Relevance and Validity of Instruments 
 
Table.3 First stage regression results for instrumental variables 
First Stage Results 
  
Nominal 
Trade share 
(lcopen) 
 
Import 
penetrations 
1985 
(Impnov85) 
 
TARS trade 
penetration 
1985 
(Tarshov85) 
 
Import 
duties as % 
Imports 
(Tariffs) 
 
Tariffs on 
international 
inputs and 
capital 
goods (Owti) 
 
Trade taxes 
(Txtrdg) 
 
Weighted 
average of 
total import 
charges  
1985 
(Totimpov85) 
 
Non trade 
barriers 
(Owqi) 
 
Non tariff 
barriers 1987 
(Ntarov87) 
          
Lfrkrom 0.586 0.589 0.512 -1.919 -0.085 0.006 -15.86 -0.0313 -13.07 
 (10.92)*** (8.43)*** (8.03)*** (-1.38) (-1.85)* (1.48) (-2.44)** (-0.74) (-2.29)** 
Engfrac 0.41 0.558 0.266 -3.14 0.028 0.021 17.26 -0.067 48.98 
 (1.99)** (2.18)*** (1.44) (-0.64) (0.37) (1.45) (1.03) (-0.13) (1.76)* 
Eurfrac -0.061 -0.143 0.074 -4.80 -0.098 -0.028 -11.08) -0.011 -42.80 
 (-0.51) (-0.85) (0.49) (-1.64)* (-1.6)* (-2.28)** (-1.03) (-0.13) (-3.7)*** 
Drop90 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 0.075 0.001 0.0005 0.284 0.001 0.378 
 (-2.64)*** (-2.06)** (-3.4)*** (1.21) (1.65)* (1.67)* (2.00)** (0.73) (1.54) 
Schday -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.037 0.001 0.001 -0.062 0.0009 0.084 
 (-0.96) (0.78) (-0.23) (0.45) (0.13) (0.05) (-0.38) (0.63) (0.28) 
Disteq -0.008 0.001 -0.0028 -0.129 -0.001 -0.0004 0.259 -0.001 0.022 
 (-2.89)*** (0.00) (-0.84) (-1.87)* (-1.29) (-1.35) (1.15) (-0.10) (0.05) 
          
N 87 72 72 70 70 45 51 69 51 
F 24.96*** 16.12*** 15.20* 5.95*** 4.66*** 5.45*** 2.11* 0.96 3.61** 
R2 0.65 0.598 0.583 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.31 0.04 0.20 
 
First Stage Results 
  
Sachs and 
Warner 
openness 
1980 
(Open80s) 
 
Leamers 
openness  
1980 
(Leamer80s) 
 
Voice and 
Accountabili
ty (Va) 
 
 
Political 
Stability 
(Ps) 
 
 
Government 
Effectivenes
s (Ge) 
 
Regulatory 
Quality (Rq) 
 
 
Rule of law 
(Rl) 
 
Control for 
Corruption 
(Ctc) 
 
Average 
Years of 
Schooling 
1999 
(Sch99) 
          
Lfrkrom 0.171 -0.102 0.198 0.126 0.155 0.043 0.157 0.229 -0.026 
 (2.10)** (-1.34) (1.85)* (1.39) (1.92)** (0.72) (2.01)** (2.66)*** (-0.12) 
Engfrac -0.098 -0.005 0.324 -0.024 0.034 -0.136 -0.035 0.479 0.502 
 (-0.30) (-0.02) (1.59) (-0.09) (0.11) (-0.86) (-0.10) (1.57) (0.56) 
Eurfrac 0.156 -0.134 0.888 0.701 0.666 0.835 0.578 0.478 2.341 
 (0.89) (-0.80) (5.04)*** (3.84)*** (4.37)*** (5.93)*** (3.60)* (3.16)*** (4.62)*** 
Drop90 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.01 -0.019 -0.013 -0.053 
 (-0.04) (-1.34) (-2.80*** (-3.4)*** (-3.8)*** (-2.9)*** (-4.9)*** (3.67)*** (-5.2)*** 
Schday -0.0002 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.01 
 (-0.06) (-0.39) (-0.38) (0.45) (0.71) (-0.77) (0.43) (0.92) (0.94) 
Disteq 0.008 0.009 0.024 0.026 0.022 0.009 0.024 0.027 0.081 
 (1.99)* (2.04)** (5.12)*** (4.89)*** (4.05)*** (2.58)*** (5.06)*** (5.06)*** (5.78)*** 
          
N 48 41 88 84 85 87 87 86 87 
F 2.16** 3.36** 31.76*** 27.64*** 25.42*** 17.21*** 37.53*** 26.54* 32.48* 
R2 0.22 0.42 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.45 0.66 0.62 0.65 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
In order to determine whether the 2SLS (2 stage least square) technique would provide 
better results than simple OLS (ordinary least square technique), the instruments should 
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be correlated with the endogenous independent variable to explain variation 
such that the later is not correlated with error term. In other words, a good instrument, 
even if it is weakly related with its endogenous independent variables, should pass the 
relevance and endogeneity tests to begin with. 2SLS for equation (1) has been run on 2 
broad specifications: (1) Openness or trade policy + Institutions + Human Capital, and 
(2) openness or trade policy + Institutions. As part of the 2SLS analysis, first stage 
regressions are run.  
 
Table 3 suggests that the respective instruments carry the right signs for the proxies of 
integration and institutions. In some cases when the instruments carry the wrong signs, 
they are also insignificant. The (FR) instrument is statistically significant for all openness 
variables and four out of six trade policy variables. Although (FR) is not significant for all 
trade-policy variables, there is a strong one-to-one correlation between trade policy and 
(FR) instrument and it enters the trade policy equation with a right sign. Similarly, ENG 
and EUR come out as sound instruments for institutions, and generally they have been 
significant and always with a right sign. Similarly, Drop90 and Schday establish themselves 
as good instruments. Drop out rates decrease institutional quality and countries with high 
drop out rates also trade less with rest of the world. Results show that countries with 
higher drop out rates would have greater levels of protection towards outside 
competition and average years of schooling decrease with increase in drop out rates. 
Schday is generally insignificant as well as Disteq but they remain important instruments 
because first stage regressions which employ all instruments give higher values of R2.  
 
According to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb, instrument is good if F-test for 
first stage regressions is equal to or greater than 10. Table 3 shows that for outcome 
based measures of trade barriers (openness), institutions and human capital F-statistic is 
much higher than 10, while for incidence based measures of trade barriers (trade policy), 
F-statistic is always less than 10. This may suggest that the instruments do work well in 
former case but the same instruments do not work well to explain trade policy and at 
best are weak. However, one may note here that Staiger and Stock rule of thumb is a 
good way to determine the validity of instruments when there is only one instrument and 
one endogenous independent variable. Stock and Yogo (2002) suggest that when the 
number of instruments is moderate or large as in our case, the first stage F-statistic does 
not provide substantial assurance that size distortion for (more than one) instrument in 
the model is controlled for. The size distortion is evidently present in first stage results as 
one can see from table 3. For many trade policy variables, most instruments actually 
work well even if the main instrument is weak (e.g. Lfrkrom). More importantly, relying 
completely on F-test statistics for first stage may lead to spurious inferences regarding 
the power of instruments because instruments may also be sensitive to other parameters 
and factors in the equation such as the very degree of endogeniety of the explanatory 
variables (Cruz and Moreira, 2005).  
 
Since it quite difficult to find instruments especially in cross sections analysis which are 
exogenous and also relevant, weak instruments have been a great cause of interest in 
literature and many strategies to cope with the problem of weak instruments have been 
proposed which suggest a use of higher order asymptotic test techniques (Staiger and 
Stock, 1997; Hahn and Hausman, 2002; Cruz and Moreira, 2005). The Cragg-Donald 
(1993) type higher order asymptotic tests can be undertaken where endogenous 
independent variables are expected to exogenously determine the dependent variable. 
For such regressions, 2SLS bias should be small and lie under the Cragg-Donald critical 
values to establish the validity of IV. To test for exogeniety of instruments, over 
identification test is needed. The presence of over identification may indicate towards 
endogeniety which can be either directly running from instruments to the error term or it 
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can be running from the variables which have been instrumented for to the error 
term. In both cases, with the presence of endogeniety in the estimation of the model, the 
purpose of utilizing instrumental variable technique would fail and simple OLS would 
become a preferred regression model. Another statistical issue which has to be addressed 
simultaneously is that of heteroskedasticity (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003).  
 
In table 4, multiple tests are carried out to determine the relevance and exogeniety of 
instruments. Second order asymptotic analysis undertaken by Staiger and Stock (1997) 
reveal that Cragg and Donald (1993) type higher order asymptotic testing was necessary 
to establish the statistical validity of instruments. Cargg Donald statistical tests show that 
all but equations 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14, have passed the 2SLS minimal bias criterion and are 
significantly different than OLS. Largely instruments pass the relevance criterion. Over-
identification test reveals that for equations 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 14 the instruments are 
not exogenous to the error terms. One commonality which can be found in these results 
is that endogeniety is generally found between instruments and error terms, when rule of 
law (Rl) has entered into the equation with the combination of openness proxies and 
human capital (Sch99). Quite interestingly, IV analysis by Rodrik at al (2004, p 143) with 
Rl and Lcopen also failed to pass several over-identification tests: 
 
Table 4. Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for LnY 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq. 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous Dependent Variable:  
Difference in Per-capita GDP at PPP, 2000 (LnY) 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust 
 
 
Maximal 
2SLS Bias 
(b) 
 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat. 
Chi-sq(3) 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of 
endogenous 
regressors 
F-Statistic 
 
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions, Human Capital  
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 ( Lcopen, Va, Sch99) 
88 Robust 0.009 11.58** 20.12*** 8.146*** 
      (0.017) 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 ( Lcopen, Ps, Sch99) 
84 Robust 0.74 1.23 18.48*** 0.129 
      (0.93) 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness,  Average Years 
of Schooling, 1999 (Lcopen, Ge, Sch99) 
85 Robust 0.88 0.64 18.84*** 0.149 
      (0.92) 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Lcopen, Rq, Sch99) 
87 Robust 0.013 10.63** 19.81*** 2.85 
      (0.24) 
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law, Average Years of Schooling, 
1999 (Lcopen, Rl, Sch199) 
87 Robust 0.39 2.99** 19.81*** 13.37*** 
      (0.001) 
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Lcpopen, Ctc, Sch99) 
86 Robust 0.81 0.97 19.35*** 0.24 
      (0.88) 
7 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Impnov85, Rl, Sch99) 
72 Robust 0.34 3.29** 14.07*** 9.91*** 
      (0.007) 
8 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Tarshov85, Rl, Sch99) 
72 Robust 0.51 2.31** 14.07*** 11.29*** 
      (0.003) 
 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions, Human Capital 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac, Dr op90, Schday) 
 
        
9 Import duties, Rule of Law, Average Years of Schooling, 1999 
(Tariff, Rl, Sch99) 
70 Robust 0.28 3.77** 13.20*** 5.91*** 
      (0.05) 
10 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law, 
Average Years of Schooling, 1999 
(Owti, Rl, Sch99) 
70 Robust 0.29 3.68** 16.09*** 6.98*** 
      (0.03) 
11 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law, Average Years of Schooling, 1999 
(Txtrdg,Rl, Sch99) 
45 Robust 0.18 4.88** 8.65*** 2.07 
      (0.35) 
12 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law, 
Average Years of Schooling, 1999  
(Totimpov85, Rl, Sch99) 
52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 5.55*** 4.602 
       
13 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law, Average Years of Schooling, 
1999 (Owqi,Rl, Sch99) 
69 Robust 0.84 0.84 15.54*** 7.86*** 
      (0.01) 
14 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Ntarfov87, R, Sch99) 
51 Robust 0.13 5.55** 9.92*** 3.73 
      (0.15) 
15 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Open80s, Rl, Sch99) 
48 Robust 0.19 4.69** 14.17*** 3.15 
      (0.20) 
16 Leamers Openness, 1980; Rule of Law, Average Years of 
Schooling, 1999 (Leamer82, Rl, Sch99) 
41 Robust 0.23 4.29** 5.66*** 2.39 
      (0.30) 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
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We find that our IV analysis mostly passes over identification tests for trade policy, if not 
openness. 2SLS Bias obtained from Cragg-Donald critical values also pass the relevance 
test of instruments for trade policy. This is interesting result in comparison to the first 
stage F-statistics provided in table (3), where F-statistics were higher for Openness 
variables passing Staiger and Stock rule of thumb; while all trade policy variables failed 
this criterion. Our results complement the assertion of Stock and Yogo (2004) and Cruz 
and Moreira (2005) that a higher order asymptotic test is necessary to ensure the 
statistical validity of weak instruments and Staiger and Stock rule of thumb may result in 
misleading statistical inference where instruments are large or moderate in number. 
Despite low values of F-statistic for trade policy proxies in the first stage, instruments 
explain them well by passing higher order asymptotic tests for relevance and exogeneity. 
3.2 Similarities between Our OLS and Rodrik et al.’s (2004) IV Analysis  
Results in table 4 also show that there are some instances of a presence of high 2SLS bias 
in favour of OLS, especially in case of such specifications where openness instead of 
trade policy enters into equation (1). OLS results are obtained for equation 1 for 
specification 1, where human capital is present in addition to institutional and openness/ 
trade policy proxies. (Table 5) The results present an interesting picture in light of Rodrik 
et al (2004). For all cases, whenever openness enters into the equation (1), it is 
insignificant. This is a similar result to Rodrik et al (2004), when they instrumented rule 
of law with settler mortality rate. They also find that openness variable has entered the 
equation mostly insignificantly. Table 5 reveals a similar pattern in our OLS analysis.  
 
If their IV estimates suffer from the problem of endogeniety as suggested by Glaeser et 
al (2004a), then our OLS analysis and Rodrik et al’s IV analysis have given similar results 
for institutions and openness because settler mortality is closely related with the human 
capital that the settlers brought to the settlements. According to Glaeser et al (2004a), 
settler mortality actually explains human capital formation in the settlements instead of 
institutions. If that is indeed the case, it is the effect of human capital formation which 
has been driving the results on institutions for Rodrik et al (2004). In this respect, our 
OLS regressions correspond to their IV. If settler mortality increases the significance of 
institutions and causes openness to lose its significance in Rodrik et al (2004), Sch99 has 
done the same in our OLS estimates. The correlation between settler mortality (a proxy 
for human capital), rule of law and income differences would capture a similar effect in 
IV than if a linear relationship is sought between Sch99 (proxy of human capital), rule of 
law (or other institutional outcome) and income difference under an OLS. 
 
Table 5 indicates that import duties (Tariffs), tariffs (Owti), trade taxes (Txtrdg) and NTBs 
(Ntarfov87) are significantly and negatively related with income differences. A higher 
coefficient of Txtrdg means that more integration with rest of the world through decrease 
in trade taxes (i.e., export taxes) is at least as relevant as developed human capital or 
strong institutions. However, only in coming lines the statistical validity can really be 
established when results based on IV analysis are discussed and similar comparisons 
between openness/trade policy, institutions and human capital are drawn. 
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Table 5. OLS Results for Openness/ Trade Policy, Institutions and Human Capital 
OLS: Dependent Variable: lnY 
 
Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions, Human Capital 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) 0.04 0.011 0.004 0.061 -0.036 -0.004   
(0.45) (0.13) (0.05) (0.70) (-0.43) (-0.05)   
Import Penetrations (Impnov85)       0.003  
      (1.15)  
TARS trade penetration (Tars85)        0.002 
       (1.53) 
Voice and Accountability (Va) 0.197        
(2.38)**        
Political Stability 
(Ps) 
 0.265       
 (2.73)***       
Government Effectiveness (Ge)   0.292      
  (2.93)***      
Regulatory Quality (Rq)    0.376     
   (3.31)***     
Rule of law (Rl)     0.923  0.2591 0.247 
    (4.39)***  (2.50)*** (2.29)** 
Control for Corruption (Ctc)      0.258   
     (2.32)***   
Average Years of Schooling 
(Sch99) 
0.258 0.251 0.237 0.232 0.217 0.245 0.243 0.239 
 (9.17)*** (9.91)*** (8.14)*** (8.77)*** (8.59)*** (8.05)*** (8.505)**
* 
(8.51)*** 
Disteq 0.148 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.0091 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 (3.70)*** (2.79)*** (3.26)*** (4.78)*** (2.35)*** (2.85)*** (3.23)*** (3.54)*** 
         
N 97 92 93 96 96 94 77 77 
F-statistic 149.2* 116.95*** 124.68*** 162.18*** 145.62*** 123.95*** 138.54*** 136.59*** 
R-Square 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.85 
 
Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions, Human Capital 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
         
Import duties (Tariffs) -0.015        
 (-2.78)***        
Tariffs on intermediate inputs 
and capital goods (Owti) 
 -0.496       
  (-2.68)***       
Trade taxes (Txtrdg)   -6.68      
  (-3.9)***      
Total  import charges 
(Totimpov85) 
   0.0007     
   (0.19)     
Non trade barriers (Owqi)     0.082    
     (0.31)    
Non tariff barriers      -0.006   
      (-3.5)***   
Sachs and Warners Openness 
(Open80s) 
      0.173  
      (1.14)  
Leamers Openness (Leamer82)        0.232 
        (1.53) 
Rule of Law (Rl) 0.41 0.294 0.497 0.304 0.328 0.243 0.179 0.528 
 (4.46)*** (2.62)*** (4.94)*** (2.32)** (2.87)*** (2.16)** (1.42) (5.97)*** 
Average Years of Schooling 
(Sch99) 
0.201 0.233 0.153 0.269 0.244 0.246 0.282 0.107 
(7.14)*** (6.81)*** (3.71)*** (7.15)*** (7.52)*** (6.96)*** (7.91)*** (3.12)*** 
Disteq 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.10 0.013 0.008 0.004 
 (2.35)** (2.71)*** (1.16) (2.25)** (2.65)*** (2.54)*** (1.71)* (1.56)* 
         
N 78 74 47 54 73 54 52 42 
F-statistic 115.48*** 130.3*** 120.0*** 36.2*** 111.85*** 47.6*** 110.48*** 90.84*** 
R-Square 0.86 0.84 0.89 0.70 0.84 0.76 0.86 0.89 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
3.3. Our IV Analysis:  
 
Before proceeding to second stage regressions, it is necessary to examine how predicted 
values of openness/ trade policy, institutions and human capital relate to per-capita 
income in a linear framework to understand the forthcoming results better. Figure 1 
provides graphical representations of linear relationship of per capita income (lnY) with 
openness (Lcopen), trade policy (Txtrdg), rule of law (Rl) and human capital (Sch99). The 
use of instrumental variables provides a clear picture of openness/ trade policy, 
institutions and human capital with regard to income. As expected Trade taxes, which 
were earlier found to be highly significant in OLS analysis, show a steeper slope showing 
higher responsiveness of income to a decline in trade taxes. Increase in general trade 
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levels (openness) may also lead to a positive effect on income but the responsiveness is 
low. The difference of slope for Lcopen and Txtrdg can be attributed to the fact that the 
level of trade, as against a direct measure of trade policy, is capturing an omitted variable 
effect. There is also presence of strong and positive responsiveness in income for 
increases in human capital (Sch99) and institutions (Rl).    
 
Figure 1. Responsiveness of Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving on to the second stage regression analysis, Table 6 provides the results for per-
capita income equation for 11 openness/trade policy variables, 6 institutional proxies and 
human capital. In specification 2, which corresponds to the specification followed by 
Rodrik et al. (2004), the results are also similar to their study. Institutions clearly trump 
openness and trade policy; openness variables remained generally insignificant and if 
significant, enter eq. (1) with a wrong sign. Trade policy variables also remained 
insignificant under specification 2 with the exception of trade taxes, which are significant 
in at least 3 out of 6 cases.  
 
However, for specification 1, where human capital also enters Eq. (1), the results present 
a different picture and challenge the position taken up by Rodrik et al. (2004). For 
specification 1, institutions are also insignificant. Compared to specification 2, the 
frequency of insignificance for openness reaches nearly 100 per cent in specifications 1 
when human capital is considered in eq 1, as well as having the wrong signs in most 
cases. The insignificance of openness proxies capturing the level of trade or movements 
in terms of trade is not surprising. These results are in accordance with the findings of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik (1998), who suggest that the correlation of trade 
levels and growth performance is at best weak. The results of this paper reinforce this 
fact in a more comprehensive manner, as it provides additional specifications to the per-
capita income equation by including human capital. The inclusion of human capital 
improved the explanatory power of this model, as is evident from higher 2R values.  
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Table 6 Second stage regression results for per-capita income under the complete set of 
specifications 
Independent Variables Specification Significant Right Sign Significant and Right Sign 
Openness 
Nominal trade shares (Lcopen)     
1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
2 1 out of 6 1 out of 6 1 out of 1 
     
Import penetrations (Impnov85)     
1 0 out of 6 2 out of 6 None 
2 4 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
     
TARS trade penetration 
(Tarshov85) 
    
1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
2 4 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
     
Trade Policy 
Import duties as % Imports (Tariffs)     
1 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None 
2 0 out of 6 6 out of 6 None 
     
Tariffs on international inputs and 
capital goods (Owti) 
    
1 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None 
2 0 out of 6 3 out of 6 None 
     
Trade taxes (Txtrdg)     
1 5 out of 6 6 out of 6 5 out of5 
2 3 out of 6 4 out of 6 3 out of 3 
     
Weighted average of total import 
charges (Totimpov85) 
    
1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
2 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None 
     
Non trade barriers (Owqi)     
1 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None 
2 0 out of 6 3 out of 6 None 
     
Non tariff barriers (Ntarov87)     
1 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None 
2 1 out of 6 4 out of 6 1 out of 1 
     
Sachs and Warner openness 
(Open80s) 
    
1 3 out of 6 6 out of 6 3 out of 3 
2 1 out of 6 5 out of 6 1 out of 1 
     
Leamers openness (Leamer80s)     
1 1 out of 6 6 out of 6 1 out of 1 
2 1 out of 6 2 out of 6 1 out of 1 
     
Institutions 
Voice and Accountability (Va) 
 
    
1 2 out of 11 9 out of 11 1 out of 1 
2 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 
     
Political Stability 
(Ps) 
 
    
1 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 
2 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 10 out of 10 
     
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     
1 1 out of 11 9 out of 11 1 out of 1 
2 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 11 out of 11 
     
Regulatory Quality (Rq) 
 
 
    
1 7 out of 11 11 out of 11 7 out of 7 
2 10out of 11 11 out of 11 10 out of 10 
     
Rule of law (Rl)     
1 1 out of 11 7 out of 11 1 out of 1 
2 10 out of 10 11 out of 11 10 out of 10 
     
Control for Corruption (Ctc)     
1 0 out of 11 3 out of 11 None 
2 9 out of 11 11 out of 11 9 out of 9 
     
Average Years of Schooling 
(Sch99) 
 
1 
 
51 out of 66 
 
55 out of 66 
 
51 out of 51 
2 57 out of 66 60 out of 66 57 out of 57 
     
     
- Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon. 1993) 
- Table illustrates results for Eq. (2.1) under various general specifications. i.e., specification 1: openness or trade policy + 
Institutions + Sch99. 
Specification 2: openness or trade policy + Institutions 
- Note that specification 3 corresponds to the one adopted by Rodrik et al. (2004) for their growth equation 
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As far as the trade policy variables are concerned, they are significant in some 
cases and the frequency of significance is much higher when compared to openness 
variables. Although trade policy indicators too can have wrong signs,3 unlike Rodrik et al. 
(2004) where in many instances openness variables show significance but carry wrong 
signs, trade policy variables, which carry incorrect signs, are generally insignificant. With 
the exception of Totimpov85, other trade policy variables always enter Eq. (1) with right 
signs whenever they are significant. Tariffs, Owti, Owqi and Ntarov87 also show wrong 
signs but in such instances, they have also been insignificant. In fact, Owqi, which has 
highest frequency of wrong signs next to Totimpov85, remains insignificant under all 
specifications and with any of the institutional combinations. By contrast, Txtrdg, which 
is the most significant trade policy variable, always enters the equation with a right 
(negative) sign showing that trade policy does matter and trade restrictiveness (export 
taxes) indeed lowers per-capita income or growth. 
 
It is also important to understand why some trade policy variables have the wrong signs or 
are insignificant, when others have passed the test by emerging as significant contributors to 
economic success. With regard to the insignificance of import taxes, Totimpov85 one can 
suggest that their contribution depends upon the composition of goods imported. Here as 
mentioned in data definitions, we know that data for Totimpov85 and Ntarfov87 is available for 
developing countries only. Thus the explanation must come in a developing country context. 
For example, in a developing country the availability of technologically superior imported 
goods has positive effects on output and growth, but if imports are dominated by 
consumption goods, a reduction in import taxes may hamper growth potentials, and at a cost 
to the public exchequer. Rodrik (1998) supports this line of argument, as he found that 
changes in import taxes fail to influence growth in sub-Saharan African countries. According 
to Rodrik (1998), it is export taxes, which if lowered, contribute to growth. Thus in the 
context of a cross-sectional study, it is wiser to examine the impact of overall trade taxes 
(import and export) instead of looking at any one of them, in order to gain a general insight 
into the workings of trade taxes apropos economic activity. According to Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000), overall trade taxes capture trade restrictiveness in a more complete manner 
than other trade policy proxies do, as it is comprised of both import and export taxes. Trade 
taxes (export plus import taxes) include developed and developing countries in its sample 
and thus the results can be comparable to the larger sample of Lcopen.  
 
Not surprisingly, Txtrg (overall trade taxes) comes out to be the most important trade policy 
variable since it shows significance in many instances in all three specifications (see Table 6). 
To be exact, Txtrdg is significant in five out of six cases in specification 1, and three out of 
six cases in specification 2. Note that trade taxes are most significant in specification 1 where 
human capital enters the per capita equation. In comparison, under the same specification, 
the institutional proxies generally enter eq. (1) as insignificant. This is again an important 
result if compared with the results obtained by Rodrik et al. (2004), where openness was 
generally insignificant and institutions (rule of law) have largely been highly significant at one 
per cent level of significance 
 
3.3.1. A Comparison of Trade Taxes (Txtrdg) with Trade Shares (Lcopen): 
 
It is evident from the overall summary of the results presented in table 6 that out come 
based measures of trade barriers perform poorly in the regressions when compared to 
incidence based measures. To further validate this observation, a detailed analysis is 
                                               
3 This occurs when import protection increases per-capita income.  
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presented in this section where performance of conventional measure of 
openness is analysed against trade taxes under two general specifications 1 and 2.  
 
Table 7 shows the results for Lcopen (openness) where it enters the per capita income 
equation with all six proxies of institutions one by one with and without human capital 
(sch99) respectively.  Out of 12 different cases, Lcopen is significant in only two of them 
and it carries a wrong sign in at least one of these two cases. In column 12, where 
openness enters with the wrong sign, the IV equation fails to pass over identification test 
as shown by the low P value highlighted in grey. In contrast, column 8 shows the only 
case where openness is significant and with the right sign, while the IV model also passes 
both over-identification test as well as relevance test as shown by high P values and 
minimal 2SLS bias respectively.  Despite this, both columns 12 and 8 represent model 
specification 2, where Sch99 is not present in the equation. In presence of Sch99, Lcopen is 
always insignificant and institutions are insignificant for 4 out of 6 cases. 
 
The very presence of human capital in combination with Lcopen and institutional proxies 
actually weakens the over all statistical validity of the model. For all instances when 
human capital has entered the equation 1 in table 7, either the model fails over-
identification test or it suffers from large 2SLS bias which favours OLS over IV. The 
poor results may indicate the problem of endogeneity which may go from Lcopen to 
human capital because of omitted variable bias or from institutions to human capital that 
has not been captured by the instruments. Employing a direct measure of trade policy 
may minimise the risk of omitted variable bias and at least the statistical validity of IV 
analysis would be more robust. A detailed analysis of trade taxes under the general 
specifications 1 and 2 suggests that for 12 different cases presented in 12 different 
columns of table 8, there is not a single instance when the IV analysis had suffered from 
the problem of endogeneity. Evidently, trade taxes improve the statistical validity of IV 
analysis in comparison to conventional measure of openness. They are also significant in 
most cases and always enter the per capita income equation with the right sign.  To really 
compare openness (Lcopen) and trade taxes (Txtrdg), similar samples have to be employed. 
Data for Lcopen is available for 170 countries and for Txtrdg the data is only available for 
54 countries. Sample details of all countries for both variables are available at the end of 
the paper. In order to compare results of Lcopen and Txtrdg, IV analysis on Lcopen is 
carried out for the reduced sample of countries corresponding to the countries for which 
data is available for Txtrdg . The results are presented in columns 13 to 18 of table 7. 
Reduced sample IV analysis for Lcopen is carried out for general model specification 1 
only, where Sch99 is regressed alongside openness and institutions. The results do not 
change in favour of openness.  
 
For a reduced sample of countries also, Lcopen is insignificant, and the IV model either 
fails over-identification tests or suffers from large 2SLS bias. One can infer from these 
results that if human capital is included along with Lcopen, OLS gives more reliable 
results.  The one instance of significance of Lcopen with the right sign in column 8 (table 
7) corresponds to the large sample of Rodrik et al (2004) where instead of settler 
mortality, the regressors are instrumented by Engfrac and Eurfrac and always fail over 
identification tests. Unlike their results, Lcopen does not fail over identification test when 
it is significant. This also means that insignificance and wrong signs of Lcopen were more 
of an outcome of endogeneity in the analysis rather than signalling towards the validity of 
the results for Rodrik et al (2004).  
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Table 7 Second stage regression results for Lcopen and institutions 
Dependent Variable: lnY 
 
Complete sample of Lcopen 
(n = 170) 
Reduced Sample of Lcopen if 
(Dum Txtrdg, n=54) 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
Nominal Trade Shares 
(Lcopen) 
0.027 0.036 -0.307 -0.126 -0.75 -0.236 0.104 0.389 -0.021 -0.237 1.189 -0.406 0.077 -0.71 -0.07 0.071 -0.2 0.246 
(0.23) (0.20) (-0.69) (-0.56) (-0.7) (-1.14) (0.84) (2.20)** (-0.10) (-1.02) (0.88) (-1.8)* (0.53) (-0.8) (-0.5) (0.39) (-1.1) (0.82) 
Voice and Accountability 
(Va) 
0.427 1.070           0.206      
(1.79)* (8.02)***           (0.68)      
Political Stability 
(Ps) 
  2.37 1.788          2.917     
  (1.51) (5.27)***          (0.97)     
Government 
Effectiveness (Ge) 
    3.54 1.519         0.666    
    (1.08) (6.08)***         (2.2)**    
Regulatory Quality (Rq)       1.003 1.486        1.459   
      (2.69)*** (7.03)***        (1.8)***   
Rule of law (Rl)         0.333 1.802       1.22  
        (0.63) (4.85)***       (2.0)**  
Control for Corruption 
(Ctc) 
          -2.81 1.488      -0.50 
          (-0.85) (5.57)***      (-0.73) 
Average Years of 
Schooling (Sch99) 
0.272  -0.194  -0.528  0.154  0.293  0.532  0.321 -0.24 0.131 0.061 0.041 0.543 
(3.43)***  (-0.39)  (-0.4)  (1.69)*  (2.18)**  (0.85)  (3.1)*** (-0.3) (1.48) (0.31) (0.21) (2.5)*** 
Disteq 0.004 0.012 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.014 0.022 0.002 -0.016 1.077 -0.0004 0.004 -0.04 0.004 0.011 -0.01 0.009 
 (0.62) (2.34)** (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.4) (0.18) (2.43)** (3.97)*** (0.32) (-1.16) (1.30) (-0.04) (0.52) (-0.8) (0.69) (1.58) (-0.88) (0.95) 
N 88 130 84 119 85 120 87 127 87 127 86 122 45 43 43 45 45 44 
F-statistic 76.59*** 78.99** 8.98*** 24.95*** 5.55 41.26*** 63.01*** 80.21*** 89.54*** 35.51*** 6.27*** 42.56*** 37.7*** 4.71 38.2*** 23.95*** 36.71** 21.7*** 
R-Square 0.80 0.53 0.57 0.08 0.05 0.44 0.76 0.51 0.84 0.33 0.85 0.457 0.816 0.39 0.83 0.70 0.81 0.69 
Maximal 2SLS Bias 0.009 0.000 0.746 0.005 0.886 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.393 0.002 0.80 0.000 0.009 0.870 0.198 0.362 0.413 0.337 
Sargan (P) 0.017** 0.27 0.748 0.67 0.928 0.24 0.24 0.405 0.001*** 0.128 0.88 0.021** 0.01*** 0.777 0.08*** 0.222 0.059 0.067 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively, Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for 
endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993) 
Table 8 Second stage regression results for Txtrdg and institutions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per-Capita Income 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
25 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
29 
 
30 
Trade Taxes (Txtrdg) -18.14 3.293 -23.21 -23.248 -16.67 -9.514 -12.261 2.38 -19.408 -22.135 -26.903 -21.909 
(-2.1)** (0.21) (-1.69)* (-1.93)* (-2.13)** (-0.62) (-1.24) (0.18) (-2.16)** (-2.10)** (-1.77)* (-2.20)** 
Voice and Accountability (Va) 0.258 1.11           
(0.65) (2.72)***           
Political Stability 
(Ps) 
  1.160 1.337         
  (1.89)* (3.16)***         
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     0.597 1.188       
    (2.18)** (3.53)***       
Regulatory Quality (Rq)       1.088 1.62     
      (1.48) (2.96)***     
Rule of law (Rl)         0.751 1.281   
        (2.06)** (2.68)***   
Control for Corruption (Ctc)           0.575 0.882 
          (1.24) (3.29)*** 
Average Years of Schooling (Sch99) 0.1707  -0.056  0.035  0.050  0.018  -0.022  
(1.25)  (-0.34)  (0.33)  (0.36)  (0.17)  (-0.10)  
Disteq 0.004 0.008 -0.011 -0.017 0.005 -0.007 0.010 0.019 -0.0015 -0.021 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.51) (0.94) (-0.65) (-1.07) (0.75) (-0.65) (1.49) (2.23)** (-0.16) (-1.19) (0.36) (-0.57) 
N 45 52 43 50 43 50 45 52 45 52 45 51 
F-statistic 34.69*** 35.22*** 19.50*** 12.12*** 32.23*** 22.64*** 63.76*** 36.79*** 53.34*** 18.49*** 23.68*** 24.08*** 
R-Square 0.76 0.66 0.49 0.25 0.79 0.61 0.79 0.61 0.80 0.49 0.61 0.61 
Maximal 2SLS Bias 0.20 0.13 0.46 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.52 0.198 0.18 0.074 0.48 0.043 
Sargan (P) 0.143 0.311 0.97 0.507 0.24 0.244 0.14 0.361 0.33 0.257 0.36 0.143 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively, Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson 
and MacKinnon. 1993), Please also refer to Table 2.11, where give results for Eq. (2.5); Txtrdg, when compared with Lcopen  is highly significant.        
 
3.3.2. Significance of Trade Policy  
  
This paper also includes more specific proxies of trade restrictiveness (tariffs and non-
tariff barriers), in an attempt to identify the optimal trade policy tools for policymakers. 
In Table 6, Owti (tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods) and Owqi (non-tariff 
barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods) have been insignificant under all 
specifications of the per-capita income equation and with any of the institutional 
combinations. Though Ntarfov (overall non-tariff barriers) shows significance for 
specification 2 when it enters the equation with rule of law, it does not say much about 
the role of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), as Ntarfov remains insignificant for the other five 
institutional proxies under the same specification. The insignificance of TB and NTBs 
does come as a surprise. Dollar and Kraay (2002) share this scepticism over the relevance 
of these measures of trade policy with the likes of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and 
Frankel and Romer (1999). Perhaps this is why trade policy variables are virtually absent 
in the recent empirical debate over trade and institutions. For example, Frankel and 
Romer (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Alcala and Ciccone (2002), 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2004) all tried to find partial effects of trade 
and institutions on per-capita income or its growth by taking into account only the 
general openness indicator (trade over GDP ratio).  
 
Many studies tried to capture the effects of trade policy on economic development: Sachs 
and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) are 
among the prominent studies that employed direct proxies of trade policies. They 
confirm that the countries with policy-induced barriers to international trade grow at a 
slower pace. Notwithstanding the important role of these studies in providing useful 
insights into the ‘trade and growth’ debate, they have two shortcomings. First, in light of 
recent evidence provided by Rodrik et al. (2004), and Dollar and Kraay (2002), their 
studies are likely to suffer from misspecification bias, as their growth equations do not 
account for institutions. Second, they assumed that trade policy is purely exogenous.  
 
Wood (2004), commenting on the ‘trade and growth’ debate not only emphasised that a 
more convincing basis for trade policy recommendations could only be provided if trade 
policy variables are included in the regressions. He also pointed out that any such 
attempt should consider trade policy as an endogenous concept as no trade policy 
recommendations can be given without taking second best effects into account. This is 
because trade policies crucially depend on the functioning of domestic markets of any 
particular country, and if these are imperfect, second best considerations enter the 
picture. The analysis here addresses the endogeneity of trade policy variables by 
regressing them on a set of instruments. Although the instruments remain general in 
nature, they do capture certain country specific characteristics. Moreover, as the per-
capita, income equation has institutional proxies and human capital along with trade 
policy variables, the analysis goes a step further from previous cross-sectional studies, 
which attempted to gauge the effects of trade policy on economic development. 
  
Although some of the present trade policy variables are insignificant, certain trade 
proxies do appear that show that trade policy matters in determining economic 
prosperity when examined alongside human capital and institutional quality variables. 
Overall, the results suggest that the general openness variables fail to explain per-capita 
income differences compared to direct proxies of the trade policy stance. For example, 
lcopen, Impnov and Tarshov show insignificance in all specifications, suggesting their weak 
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relationship with income. By contrast, the results suggest that decreases in overall trade 
taxes are associated with strong improvements in economic performance.  
3.3.3. Comparative Relevance of different Institutional Concepts to Income 
generation:  
 
The paper has employed outcome based general definitions of institutions capturing 
some of the key governance characteristics. To really differentiate between them is 
difficult. They are all proxies of good governance. Nevertheless, presence of six different 
identification of the general definition of institutions does at the end brings about certain 
subtle differentiations between these proxies of good governance and which have been 
discussed by Kaufman et al(2003) in detail.  
 
Table 10 focuses on the summary of the results on institutions and their apparent role in 
economic development under specification 2 and which corresponds to the Rodrik et al. 
(2004) specification while partially supplementing their assertion that institutional 
development is the key to economic development. As the six institutional proxies shown 
below have largely been significant when paired with any of the openness and trade 
policy variables under specification 2; it would be of interest to know which institutional 
concepts are relatively more relevant or more sensitive in explaining income differentials 
across countries.  
 
 
Table 10 shows that regulatory quality is the most relevant institutional definition in 
determining economic performance as it has one of the highest coefficients in nearly all 
instances. The superiority of regulatory quality is self-evident because it captures the 
policy choices that dictate market outcomes. For example, it measures the incidence of 
market-unfriendly policies such as protection of imports, control on foreign ownership, 
obstacles to foreign bidders on public contracts, real personal tax as a burden to 
enterprise, real corporate tax as a disincentive for entrepreneurship, the legal framework 
as an obstacle to competitiveness, customs as an impediment to international trade, price 
controls and competition laws as obstacles to competition. The key to development may 
lie in market-friendly regulations through which the workings of financial and 
commercial institutions improve and adequate business development takes place amid 
increased competition. The importance of prudential regulation shows in the fact that 
many developing countries have done well, despite being autocratic states. China and 
South Korea are the prime examples in this regard. Glaeser et al. (2004a, 2004b) suggest 
that China, South Korea and Taiwan witnessed unprecedented increases in their growth 
rates under the reign of one-party dictatorships all due to the promotion of pro-market, 
pro-growth policies, securing property rights and securing competition.  
 
Following regulatory quality, government effectiveness is the relevant proxy. Again, 
this meets expectations because government effectiveness is very close to regulatory 
quality in the sense that the former focuses on inputs required for the government to 
produce and implement robust policies whereas the latter captures these policies itself. 
‘Government effectiveness’ measures the quality of public service provision, the quality 
of bureaucracy, independence of civil service from political pressures, and credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies. In other words, it captures the efficient 
functioning of government machinery.  
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Table 10  Institutional comparisons 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
(Va) 
Politcal 
Stability 
(Ps) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(Ge) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(Rq) 
Rule of Law 
(Rl) 
Control for 
Corruption 
(Ctc) 
Control 
Variables 
      
(Lcopen) 1.037 2.132 1.375 1.546 1.837 1.181 
 (4.52)*** (2.86)*** (4.04)*** (4.07)*** (2.76)*** (5.03)*** 
(Impnov85) 1.109 2.242 1.805 1.464 2.35 1.682 
 (6.64)*** (3.53)*** (4.13)*** (6.44)*** (3.11)*** (3.71)*** 
(Tarshov85) 1.484 1.543 1.568 2.192 1.412 1.474 
 (10.93)*** (9.84)*** (10.30)*** (10.73)*** (12.12)*** (9.34)*** 
(Tariffs) 1.23 1.357 1.354 1.683 0.811 0.885 
 (1.64)* (2.95)*** (2.19)** (3.28)*** (2.16)** (1.30) 
(Owti) 1.456 1.481 1.701 1.928 1.341 1.491 
 (6.37)*** (7.76)*** (5.94)*** (7.11)*** (8.38)*** (5.93)*** 
(Txtrdg) 1.110 1.337 1.188 1.62 1.281 0.882 
 (2.72)*** (3.16)*** (3.53)*** (2.96)*** (2.68)*** (3.29)*** 
(Totimpov85) 1.113 1.906 2.417 1.542 1.821 2.434 
 (5.31)*** (3.96)*** (3.88)*** (5.61)*** (4.27)*** (4.72)*** 
(Owqi) 1.46 1.481 1.701 1.928 1.341 1.490 
 (6.37)*** (7.76)*** (5.90)*** (7.11)*** (8.38)*** (5.93)*** 
(Ntarfov87) 0.616 1.861 2.68 0.707 0.936 1.181 
 (1.78)*** (2.24)** (1.68)* (1.09) (1.73)* (1.93)*** 
(Open80s) 1.085 1.3904 1.258 1.296 0.095 0.225 
 (3.89)*** (2.63)*** (3.13)*** (2.92)*** (0.12) (0.33) 
(Leamer82) 0.983 1.094 0.951 1.387 0.9036 0.774 
 (4.97)*** (2.54)*** (2.16)** (3.59)*** (1.79)* (1.75)* 
t- values are in the parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively, Control variables are in first column in 
paranthesis, Note: The above table provides IV regression coefficients of institutions under specification 3 of the per-capita income equation (Eq. 2.1). 
Note that specification 3, which only employs institutions and openness in order to explain income differences, is the one followed by Rodrik et al. 
(2004). 
 
 
The third more relevant institutional concept is political stability. It actually captures 
political instability arising from conflict via armed conflict, social unrest, politically 
motivated violence or terrorist threats. Large-scale conflict in the contemporary world 
mainly takes the form of internal wars in developing countries. There have been more 
than 40 civil war episodes since the end of the cold war. These conflicts are a major 
cause of development failure, contributing to the persistence of poverty.  
 
Rule of law and control for corruption follow political stability. Rule of law measures, 
respect for societal rules, confidence in the supremacy of law and captures the public 
perception of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. In short, it accounts for 
the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules 
form the basis for economic and social interactions. On the other hand, control for 
corruption measures corruption within the legal, financial or economic system, which 
distorts the competitive environment, and reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to abuse positions of power through bribes, patronage and 
nepotism.  
 
Voice and accountability, corresponding to democracy, is the institutional proxy that 
would be comparatively less effective in explaining per capita income differences. It 
captures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political right and 
measures the transparency of political, commercial and legal institutions. The view of 
Barro (1996) is that democracy can positively affect growth when personal and political 
freedoms are very weak, but lowers growth when some liberties are already in place. This 
suggests a quadratic relationship between democracy and growth, it is first positive and 
then negative. Voice and accountability may matter less when government effectiveness, 
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regulatory capacity and the rule of law are well established and function well. However, 
democracy may be of greater importance when these other factors are weak.   
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4.    Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Do institutions dominate international economic integration in explaining differences in per-
capita income across countries? It is impossible to overemphasise the importance of 
institutions in determining the economic development of a country. Institutions, whether the 
rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption or government effectiveness, are all prerequisites for development and are the 
catalyst for the success of any development strategy. The fact remains that institutions or 
institutional development is a long-term phenomenon, and is not an objective policy concept 
for short-term economic strategies to achieve higher economic growth. That is why even 
after finding institutions rule over integration, Rodrik et al. (2004) appropriately conclude 
their paper with following the following heading: 
 
‘The Hard Work is still Ahead: How much guidance do our results provide to policy makers 
who want to improve the performance of their economies? Not much at all. Sure, it is 
helpful to know that geography is not destiny, or that focusing on increasing the economy’s 
links with world markets is unlikely to yield convergence. But the operational guidance that 
our central result on the primacy of institutional quality yields is extremely meagre.’ (157) 
 
Mere institutional superiority has no practical application for policymakers in the short-
term. Since institutions cannot be modified in a short span of time, they may be beyond the 
scope of a lot of policymaking. How can the importance of institutions become more 
relevant for policymakers, by unlocking this ‘institutional dilemma’? To this effect, the 
current research sought a close substitute for institutions, which would also respond to the 
short-term policy time-frame. According to Glaeser et al. (2004a), the existing research 
cannot convincingly show that institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on 
economic growth. They provide evidence to suggest that it is human capital, which also 
contributes to institutional development and not the other way around. ‘Education is needed 
for courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions. 
Literacy encourages the spread of knowledge about government malfeasance. Social 
connections make it possible to form private groups, which then take on the task of 
challenging the state. According to this view, countries differ ultimately in their stocks of 
human and social capital, and the institutional outcomes depend on this endowment.’ (Ibid 
2004:19) An important message one can extract from their paper is that human capital can 
be a close substitute for institutions, as human capital and institutions tend to move 
together: ‘All or nearly all high human capital countries are stable democracies. All or nearly 
all low human capital countries are dictatorships, with virtually no checks and balances.’ (Ibid 
2004a: 41) 
 
To summarise, opening up domestic markets to foreign competition by revoking trade 
restrictions and trade barriers can be good for economic performance. Second, developing 
human capital is as important as superior institutional functioning for economic wellbeing. 
Indeed the accumulation of human capital stocks via increased education might lead to 
improved institutional functioning, and the utilisation of policies like trade liberalisation. The 
evidence regarding the importance of human capital is clear in the growth literature. Indeed 
any currently developed country, or any country on the verge of development, has first seen 
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significant improvements in human capital. Policies aimed at educational improvement yield 
a double dividend: they improve institutions in the long-term and in the short-term, they will 
allow for greater gains to the economy from trade liberalisation. Eventually, superior 
institutional functioning will lead to greater home grown (endogenous) democracy and make 
absolute poverty unacceptable.  
 
With regard to the role of international integration versus institutions, the finding here is 
that openness counts for little per se in explaining income differences across countries. This is 
because it is an outcome and not a cause. Trade policies, and liberalisation, on the other hand, 
are significant in explaining cross-country per-capita income variation. With regard to trade 
policies, the data show that the overall policy stance, particularly those associated with black 
market premia in foreign exchange markets and export taxes, are most important. The 
presence of these two phenomena relate closely to poor institutional performance. Tariffs 
and quotas on imports, however, are of secondary importance, indicating that they are less 
growth retarding. 
 
Finally, a cautionary note on the institutional data (Kaufmann et al. 2002) is in order. 
Much of this data, as Glaeser et al. (2004a and 2004b) argue, are outcome variables, except 
perhaps for the rule of law. Future studies need to employ better indicators of institutional 
policies. 
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List of Countries for Openness (Exports +Imports)/GDP, 1985: Lcopen 
Angola 
Albania 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Burundi 
Belgium 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Bangladesh 
Bulgaria 
Bahrain 
Bahamas, The 
Belarus 
Belize 
Bermuda 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Barbados 
Bhutan 
Botswana 
Central African Republic 
Canada 
Switzerland 
Chile 
China 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Congo, Rep. 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Cape Verde 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
 
Algeria 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Eritrea 
Spain 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
Fiji 
France 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Gabon 
United Kingdom 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Gambia, The 
Guinea-Bissau 
Equatorial Guinea 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Hong Kong, China 
Honduras 
Croatia 
Haiti 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
India 
Ireland 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Iceland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Cambodia 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Korea, Rep. 
 
Kuwait 
Lao PDR 
Lebanon 
St. Lucia 
Sri Lanka 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Macao, China 
Morocco 
Moldova 
Madagascar 
Mexico 
Macedonia, FYR 
Mali 
Malta 
Myanmar 
Mongolia 
Northern Mariana Islands 
Mozambique 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Nicaragua 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Papua New Guinea 
Poland 
Puerto Rico 
Portugal 
Paraguay 
 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Senegal 
Singapore 
Sierra Leone 
El Salvador 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Suriname 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Swaziland 
Seychelles 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Chad 
Togo 
Thailand 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Taiwan 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Venezuela, RB 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Rep. 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 
South Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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List of Countries for Trade Taxes/ Trade, 1982: Txtrdg 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Congo, Rep. 
Colombia 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Spain 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
United Kingdom 
Greece 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
India 
Ireland 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Kuwait 
Sri Lanka 
 
Lesotho 
Morocco 
Mexico 
Macedonia, FYR 
Mauritania 
Malaysia 
Niger 
Nicaragua 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Rwanda 
Singapore 
Sweden 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Tanzania 
United States 
Venezuela, RB 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 
South Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
